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Abstract— Recent work characterizing the optimal per-
formance of secrecy systems has made use of a distortion-
like metric for partial secrecy as a replacement for the
more traditional metric of equivocation. In this work we use
the log-loss function to show that the optimal performance
limits characterized by equivocation are, in fact, special
cases of distortion-based counterparts. This observation
illuminates why equivocation doesn’t tell the whole story
of secrecy. It also justifies the causal-disclosure framework
for secrecy (past source symbols and actions revealed to
the eavesdropper).
Secrecy systems have a dual purpose—to reliably
communicate to an intended receiver while hiding the
information from an eavesdropper. Reliable commu-
nication is typically measured operationally—i.e. the
reconstruction of the information content must have a
negligible probability of error, or when perfect transmis-
sion is not possible, a distortion constraint is met. On the
other hand, the conventional approach for information
theoretic secrecy is to measure the secrecy aspect of the
communication using equivocation (the posterior entropy
of the information signal), rather than an operational
quantity. In this case, entropy and mutual information are
a part of the problem statement itself, rather than being
unexpectedly discovered in the answer. Thus, this line
of research forfeits one of the most elegant trademarks
of information theory.
There are two regimes of interest in information
theoretic secrecy, the perfect secrecy regime, and the
partial secrecy regime. The perfect secrecy case, where
no information is leaked to the eavesdropper, is where
the subtleties of “strong secrecy” versus “weak secrecy”
(whether or not the leaked mutual information is neg-
ligible before or after being normalized by n) enters
the conversation. That is not the regime of interest in
this paper. This paper is focussed mainly on the partial
secrecy case.
The use of equivocation “as a measure of the degree to
which the wire-tapper is confused” can be found at least
as early as Wyner’s work on the wiretap channel [1]. A
direct reference to this standard was made by Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner in their related work in [2], where they also
use normalized equivocation to quantify partial secrecy.
This trend continues today, as is evident in these recent
contributions: [3], [4], [5], [6]. It is true that Shannon’s
much earlier 1949 paper on secrecy systems [7] also
refers to equivocation, but in his case it was simply
used as an analysis tool, not a definition of secrecy—
the extreme values of equivocation correspond to perfect
secrecy and error-free decoding, both of which can be
defined with simple, operational statements.
In [8] and [9], we proposed a rate-distortion approach
to measuring partial secrecy. The communication system
is designed to guarantee a certain level of distortion
in the eavesdropper’s reconstruction of the information
source. It was discovered that the richest theories emerge
when the eavesdropper is empowered by having causal
access to either the information signal or the intended
receiver’s reconstruction or both in addition to eaves-
dropping on the communication. Without this causal
disclosure of information, the communication system can
get away with inexpensive tricks to keep the eavesdrop-
per’s distortion high even while the eavesdropper has
very little uncertainty about the information signal [10].
The causal disclosure of information to the eaves-
dropper in [8] and [9] plays a fundamental role in the
results, yet it is an uncommon assumption in commu-
nication systems. An operational justification for causal
disclosure is that the eavesdropper is actively trying to
disturb the system—the distortion function measuring
the eavesdropper’s performance can be generalized to
be the payoff of a zero-sum repeated game between the
eavesdropper and the system. In a repeated game context,
disclosure of the past actions in the game can be a natural
assumption. However, the results of this work provide
an entirely different justification for the rate-distortion-
with-causal-disclosure framework for measuring partial
secrecy.
It turns out that the equivocation approach to measur-
ing partial secrecy and the rate-distortion approach are
not in fact two different approaches. The rate-distortion
approach provides the general theory, yielding the opti-
mal equivocation characterization as a special case. In
fact, equivocation is one of the most blunt special cases
of the theory in the sense that it requires the least care in
designing the optimal communication system. The idea
of this work is very simple. We apply the theorems for
rate-distortion theory with causal disclosure in [9] to the
log-loss distortion function. This technique immediately
generalize to any secrecy setting. That is, once distortion-
based secrecy with causal disclosure is understood for
a secrecy setting, then the characterization of optimal
equivocation can be readily obtained.
I. RATE-DISTORTION THEORY WITH CAUSAL
DISCLOSURE
Consider a cipher system with an i.i.d. information
source, Xi ∼ PX . Secret key is available at a rate of
R0 bits per source symbol to the encoder A and the
decoder B. The encoder transmits a message M at rate
R bits per source symbol to the decoder which is also
received by the eavesdropper. The decoder then produces
a sequence Yi, the eavesdropper produces a sequence
Zi, and the performance of the system is measured by a
payoff function pi(Xi, Yi, Zi)
From [9] we obtain theorems that give so-call “single-
letter” information theoretic characterizations of the fol-
lowing three quantities for any payoff function pi and
source distribution PX .
sup
A,B,n
min
{Zi=zi(M,Xi−1)}
E
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi, Yi, Zi), (1)
sup
A,B,n
min
{Zi=zi(M,Y i−1)}
E
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi, Yi, Zi), (2)
sup
A,B,n
min
{Zi=zi(M,Xi−1,Y i−1)}
E
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi, Yi, Zi). (3)
The difference between these three quantities is the
information that the Eavesdropper has available when
forming Zi.
II. LOG-LOSS
Consider three log-loss payoff functions
pi1(x, y, z) = log
1
z(x)
,
pi2(x, y, z) = log
1
z(y)
,
pi3(x, y, z) = log
1
z(x, y)
,
where x and y have domains X and Y , and z is a
probability mass function on the space X for pi1, the
space Y for pi2, and the space X × Y for pi3. In other
words, z(a) ≥ 0 for all a, and
∑
a z(a) = 1.
Log-loss functions have been studied as distortion
functions for multiterminal source coding in [11] and
[12], in which the authors refer to the use of log-
loss functions in the study of information bottleneck in
[13] and as a distortion measure in image processing
[14]. Our reason for analyzing communication under
this payoff (or “distortion”) function is the following
convenient property:
min
Z=z(U)
E pi1(X,Y, Z) = min
Z=z(U)
E log
1
Z(X)
= H(X |U),
where X , Y , and U are arbitrarily correlated. Likewise,
min
Z=z(U)
E pi2(X,Y, Z) = H(Y |U),
min
Z=z(U)
E pi3(X,Y, Z) = H(X,Y |U).
III. EQUIVOCATION AS A SPECIAL CASE
We now specialize the rate-distortion theory for se-
crecy systems with causal disclosure to the case of log-
loss payoff functions. For example, consider substituting
pi1 as the payoff function in (1).
sup
A,B,n
min
{Zi=zi(M,Xi−1)}
E
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi1(Xi, Yi, Zi)
= sup
A,B,n
min
{Zi=zi(M,Xi−1)}
E
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
1
Zi(Xi)
= sup
A,B,n
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|M,X
i−1)
= sup
A,B,n
1
n
H(Xn|M).
This quantity defines the optimal normalized equivoca-
tion (with respect to the information source X) that a
cipher can achieve. We can then apply the information
theoretic theorems of [9] to obtain a characterization of
this quantity—the optimal equivocation.
Before we proceed we must point out one subtle
detail. The log-loss payoff function puts no constraint
that the intended receiver must produce an output Y that
is correlated with the information source X . In fact, it
rewards the system for choosing Y independent of X
and sending no description of X . In order to impose a
genuine communication requirement, we add a second
distortion constraint, aside from the log-loss payoff. The
constraint is 1
n
∑n
i=1 d(Xi, Yi) < D, and the theorems
of [9] are readily generalized to include more than one
payoff (or distortion) function.
This leads us to our resulting statements about equiv-
ocation in a cipher system. Upon simplifying Theorems
7.1, 7.2, and 3.1 of [9] using the payoff functions pi1,
pi2, and pi3 we obtain the following theorem (proof of
simplification omitted):
Theorem 3.1: For a cipher system with communica-
tion rate R, secret key rate R0, source distribution PX ,
and satisfying an average distortion constraint of D at the
intended receiver (as measured by d(x, y)), the following
three statements hold:
Equivocation of the information source:
sup
A,B,n
1
n
H(Xn|M) = H(X)− [R(D)−R0]+.
Equivocation of the reconstruction:
sup
A,B,n
1
n
H(Y n|M)
= max
(X,Y,U)∈P
(H(Y )− [I(Y ;U)−R0]+) .
Equivocation of the source and reconstruction:
sup
A,B,n
1
n
H(Xn, Y n|M)
= max
(X,Y,U)∈P
(H(X,Y )− [I(X,Y ;U)−R0]+) .
Here [·]+ = max{0, ·}, R(D) is the rate-distortion
function for distortion d and source distribution PX , and
P is the set of random variable triples that satisfy
X − U − Y form a Markov chain,
E d(X,Y ) ≤ D,
I(X ;Y ) ≤ R.
IV. SUMMARY
Information theory allows us to understand the optimal
use of communication resources not only in the ideal
settings of lossless compression, noise free communica-
tion channels, or perfect secrecy, but also in the imper-
fect settings. Rate-distortion theory helps us understand
optimal partial communication. Similarly, we endeavor
to understand partial secrecy, for situations that do not
permit perfect secrecy. We see from this work that
a distortion-based measure of secrecy which includes
causal disclosure of information to the eavesdropper
(in addition to the intercepted communication signal)
provides a rich theory for understanding secrecy. This
theory subsumes the conventional equivocation based
approach to secrecy in that the latter is a special case
of the rate-distortion theory via the log-loss function.
This analysis also highlights the blunt nature of the
equivocation approach to secrecy. In general, distortion-
based performance in a secrecy system is optimized by
a carefully crafted communication scheme. However,
in the special case of log-loss (i.e. the equivocation
characterization), many different encoding variations are
optimal, including in particular random binning or time-
sharing. An analogy to this occurs in lossy compression.
If the goal in lossy compression were simply to mini-
mize the equivocation at the intended receiver, then any
message transmission would be equally good, as long as
it is a fully entropic function of the information source.
But rate-distortion theory reveals much more than this
about the nature of partial information.
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